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THE MODERN DAY SCARLET LETTER: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERN
PROBATION CONDITIONS
There can be no outrage, methinks, against our common nature,-
whatever be the delinquencies of the individual,-no outrage more fla-
grant than to forbid the culprit to hide his face for shame; as it was the
essence of this punishment to do.1
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured the
wearer,-so that both men and women, who had been familiarly ac-
quainted with Hester Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld her
for the first time,-was that SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically em-
broidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It had the effect of a spell,
taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity, and enclosing
her in a sphere by herself.2
Nathaniel Hawthorne,
The Scarlet Letter
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Scarlet Letter, Nathaniel Hawthorne describes the plight of
Hester Prynne, the adulteress forced to wear a scarlet "A" on her chest
to show her crime. In this fictional account of seventeenth century Bos-
ton, Hawthorne's searing example of Hester Prynne embodies what then
was society's use of punishment by humiliation. Curiously, proving
again that "history" tends to repeat itself, some modern probation condi-
tions resemble Hester Prynne's scarlet letter and similar forms of early
punishment by humiliation.
Criminal punishment 3 can serve many purposes: retribution, reha-
bilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation. However, both commentators
and the United States Sentencing Commission have rejected the notion
that in our modem day the purpose of punishment is rehabilitation. Pro-
fessor Packer wrote in 1969 that "there are two and only two ultimate
1. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 53 (Bantam Classic ed. 1986) (1850).
2. Id. at 51.
3. As used in the Note, the term "punishment" refers only to criminal punishment. Many
things that constitute punishment (e.g., punitive damages) are not criminal punishment. As Profes-
sor Packer has put it: "Punishment is a concept; criminal punishment is a legal fact." H. PACKER,
THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35 (1968).
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purposes to be served by criminal punishment: the deserved infliction of
suffering on evildoers and the prevention of crime."'4 In addition, the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 5 drafted by the United States Sentencing
Commission, states that the purpose of punishment is retribution, educa-
tion, deterrence, and incapacitation;6 the Sentencing Commission thus
rejects the notion that punishment serves to rehabilitate.
While probation has as its primary goal rehabilitation, 7 as a practi-
cal matter judges cannot impose probation conditions entirely devoid of
punitive elements. As a result, appellate courts should evaluate the puni-
tive elements of probation conditions to ensure that they are not perva-
sive, since such punitive conditions would defeat probation's statutorily
mandated goal of rehabilitation. Moreover, apart from any statutory
analysis, reviewing courts should subject such punitive conditions to
scrutiny under the eighth amendment.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss and analyze the proliferation
of modem probation conditions that resemble the scarlet letter in both
their purpose and effect. These conditions, though they do not involve
wearing a scarlet "A" or the like, subject the defendant to the same pub-
lic humiliation and ridicule as did Hester Prynne's scarlet letter. This
Note asserts that certain modem probation conditions, those that effec-
tively label the defendant, in fact constitute a form of punishment. As a
result, these conditions should be reevaluated critically in light of proba-
tion's primary goal of rehabilitation.8 The reevaluation should involve a
"mixture" analysis-that is, judges should evaluate the totality of the
probation conditions imposed in order to determine whether the mixture
of conditions is within the limits of the statutory mandate. 9 Characteriz-
ing probation conditions as punishment will force courts to properly
limit the use of probation conditions to a mixture that comports with the
rehabilitative goal of probation. Additionally, to ensure that probation-
ers receive the same constitutional protections afforded prisoners, courts
should subject punitive probation conditions to constitutional scrutiny
under the eighth amendment.
This Note begins by briefly tracing the history of early forms of pun-
ishment and ultimate means of deterrence on which early punishment
relied-public humiliation. Part III highlights a number of modem scar-
4. Id. at 36.
5. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-86 (1982 & Supp. V), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
98 (1982 & Supp. V). The Supreme Court upheld the sentencing guidelines as constitutional in
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V).
7. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
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let-letter type probation conditions. Part IV examines the accepted goals
of probation and the obvious tension that exists between the punitive na-
ture of modem probation conditions and the rehabilitative goal of proba-
tion. Following a discussion of the goals of probation, Part V analyzes
current limitations, non-constitutional and constitutional, on judicial dis-
cretion when imposing probation conditions. After establishing such a
framework, this Note argues that modem scarlet-letter probation condi-
tions resembling the historical antecedents of punishment constitute pun-
ishment by humiliation. Consequently, Part VI concludes that certain
scarlet-letter probation conditions improperly mix punitive and rehabili-
tative conditions and, as a result, do not fulfill the statutorily mandated
rehabilitative goal of probation. While such conditions are not per se
improper, they should not be imposed by what amounts to judicial
legislation.
Independent of the proper mixture of probation conditions, Part VI
also suggests that courts should subject punitive probation conditions to
an eighth amendment analysis. Failure to apply the eighth amendment's
"dignity of man" standard to punitive probation conditions results in
probationers receiving less constitutional protection than if they were
incarcerated.10
II. PROBATION AS PUNISHMENT
A fundamental flaw in both scholarly and judicial evaluations of
probation conditions is the accepted premise: It's probation, therefore
it's not punishment.11 Before any statutory or constitutional analysis can
take place, the premise that probation is punishment must be proved.
Probation conditions are not always entirely punitive in nature; nor are
probation conditions and punishment mutually exclusive. Rather, any
given set of conditions may serve to deter, rehabilitate, or punish. But
the role of the courts, and the endeavor of this Note, is to look behind the
labels that the conditions carry to ascertain what functional purpose is
being served, and then to review the conditions in the light of that func-
tional purpose.
10. See infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
11. Some have actually assumed it without even trying to prove it. See, eg., Springer v. United
States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945) (since eighth amendment only applies to punishment,
probation conditions not subject to constitutional scrutiny). Conversely, others have assumed that
probation is punishment also without trying to prove it. See, ag., Note, Criminal Procedure: When
Hester Prynne Drives Drunk- An Examination of the Constitutional Challenges to the Requirement of
a "Scarlet Bumper Sticker" as a Condition of Probation on DUI Offenses, 41 OKLA. L. REv. 529, 541
(1988) ("[b]ecause probation is a form of punishment .... ).
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A survey of scarlet-letter type probation conditions suggests that the
premise that probation is "punishment" holds credence. As discussed
below, scarlet-letter conditions resemble older forms of punishment by
humiliation and, as this resemblance illustrates, they also fail to serve the
traditional rehabilitative goal of probation.
A. Public Humiliation as a Focus of Early Punishments.
At its most primitive stages, penologists considered punishment nec-
essary to remove the evil spirit thought to cause an individual to trans-
gress against society. 12 However, a historical examination of punishment
reveals that- early forms of punishment reflected man's inhumanity to
man. 13
Early societies divided crimes into two groups: "(1) the criminal
cases calling for social action in apprehension and punishment, and (2)
the civil cases (torts) which are a private matter."1 4 Criminal cases were
crimes against the society; accordingly, the entire community would rep-
rimand individuals committing such crimes.15 Entire tribes and villages
gathered to expel the criminal from his social group.' 6 Punishment in
this context served as a means by which the entire society collectively
expressed its disapproval. Today, this function is carried out symboli-
cally by public officials who enforce the laws of society by prosecuting
criminals.
Early forms o punishment contained a strong element of gross pub-
lie humiliation; 17 in fact, public humiliation enhanced traditional physi-
cal punishments and functioned as punishment by itself.'8 Physical
punishments such as hanging, drawing, and quartering were carried out
publicly in ceremonial fashion,' 9 thereby emphasizing the degrading na-
ture of public executions. 20 Ritualistic mutilation focused the commu-
nity's attention on the humiliation component of punishment. As one
12. See, eg., H. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT: A RECORD OF MAN'S INHUMANITY
TO MAN 39 (1930); D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 3 (2d ed.
1969).
13. For an in-depth analysis and historical account of the history of punishments, see C. HI-
BERT, THE ROOTS OF EVIL (1963); G. IVES, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS (1914). A good
concise description of the various types of punishments not discussed in this Note can be found in H.
McDONNELL, IN THE THROES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, DEVELOP-
MENT AND FAILURE OF OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 123-50 (1986).
14. H. BARNES, supra note 12, at 40.
15. Id.
16. Id at 42.
17. Id. at 43.
18. C. HIBBERT, supra note 13, at 28.
19. Id. at 27.
20. Id.
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commentator noted, "a horrifying example was not, though, the only
purpose behind [such rituals] .... It was also intended that the victim
should be humiliated, for degradation figured largely in all contemporary
theories of punishment. '21
Whereas the humiliation element of a hanging may pale against the
physical element, early societies did not restrict their placement of public
stigmas only to capital crimes. Late oriental and classical societies en-
gaged in branding as a means of punishing common criminals. The Ro-
mans, French, and English developed and used branding as a means of
identifying criminals by the crime that they had committed. 22 Branding,
a method widely used in the seventeenth century, consisted of burning a
single letter representing the first letter of the crime committed onto the
perpetrator's face.23 An "M" would be branded on a murderer; a "T"
branded on a thief. This cruel method of marking would preclude those
who were branded from finding employment and thus "render[ing] them
desperate."'24 The American Colonies also generally used branding;25
New Jersey, for example, punished burglary by branding the criminal's
hand for a first offense and her forehead for subsequent offenses.26
Flogging and the use of pillories, which developed to punish those
criminals whose offense did not warrant the severe penalty of flogging,
called for a public display of the criminal. Indeed, arguably the only
punishment inflicted by the pillory was that caused by public display.
Flogging, of course, imposed the additional element of physical suffering:
"When the pillory was employed in a simple fashion and not accompa-
nied by any other mode of punishment, its operation was chiefly psycho-
logical, and it was designed to bring about the feeling of humiliation
naturally attendant upon the infliction of public disgrace. '27
The stocks and pillory inflicted primarily psychological rather than
physical punishment. In early societies, when villages and communities
were close-knit groups, to be shunned by the entire community "was no
trifling penalty."' 28 Once the spectacle was over, those punished,
although released from punishment, never would return to their previous
21. Id.
22. H. BARNES, supra note 12, at 62.
23. I
24. G. IvES, supra note 13, at 53.
25. H. BARNES, supra note 12, at 67.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 62-63.
28. G. IvEs, supra note 13, at 55. Other examples of punishment by humiliation can be found
under what one author has labeled "poetic punishments": a baker selling "short" loaves was forced
to wear a loaf of bread around his neck; a fishmonger found to be selling bad fish was sentenced to
wear a "collar of stinking smelts slung over his shoulder." Id. at 55-56.
1361
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
place in society. The "everybody knows everybody else's business"
mentality that existed in the early communities ensured stigmatization.
Public humiliation or stigmatization thus played a major role in
punishment for early societies. As society developed, though, a more hu-
manitarian approach to punishment also evolved. As a result, society
began to reject these historical forms of punishment. In the late 1800s,
American courts expressed their disapproval by declaring the pillories
and stocks "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Constitu-
tion.29 However, some courts recently have breathed new life into mod-
em methods of humiliation and public disgrace, thereby reinvigorating
psychological punishment in a different form.
III. MODERN SCARLET-LETTER CONDITIONS
Some courts presently impose punishment by public humiliation-
in the form of "scarlet letter" conditions-under the guise of probation.
Such punitive conditions are not inherently wrong and, in fact, may
prove particularly useful in a system struggling to find effective methods
of imposing sanctions. The problem is that courts have failed to recog-
nize the conflict that results when scarlet-letter conditions impose pun-
ishment. Imposition of punitive probation conditions may deprive
probationers of significant legal rights30 and, by exceeding statutory limi-
tations on probation conditions, may constitute judicial legislation. A
determination that such conditions are an appropriate criminal sanction
is better left to the legislature. To illustrate the kinds of conditions
courts have imposed, the following sections discuss several innovative
scarlet-letter conditions that vary in their degree of punishment by
humiliation.
A. Purse Snatcher Required to Wear Tap Shoes.
In the 1976 California case of People v. McDowell,3 1 the defendant
was convicted of purse-snatching. 32 The key to the defendant's success
was his ability to sneak up silently-he usually wore tennis shoes-and
make a quick getaway with his victim's purse.33 In an attempt to make
the punishment fit the crime, the trial court required, as a condition of
probation, that the defendant "wear leather shoes with metal taps on the
29. See, eg., Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893).
30. See infra notes 134-60 and accompanying text (suggesting that probationers should be pro-
tected from the imposition of conditions that severely hamper probation's rehabilitative goal and
protected from conditions that violate eighth amendment).
31. 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
32. Id. at 810, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
33. Id.
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heels and toes anytime he leaves his house."'34 The defendant challenged
the condition as cruel and unusual and as "tantamount to hanging a sign
around [his] neck that says, 'I am a thief.' -35 The California Court of
Appeals found this argument unpersuasive, stating that merely because a
condition is unusual or out of the ordinary does not make it constitution-
ally unreasonable.3 6 The court of appeals never addressed directly
whether the condition amounted to punishment; it did, however, reverse
on grounds that the trial court's order was too imprecise.37
B. Drunk Driver Required to Place Apology in Newspaper.
In a second type of scarlet-letter case, a judge forced drunk drivers
in Illinois in 1988 to place an apology and a photograph in the defend-
ant's hometown newspaper. Judge Jeffrey Ford of the Champaign Cir-
cuit Court imposes such a condition on convicted drunk drivers because
he firmly believes in its deterrent effect.38 Admonishment that occurs
only within the confines of the courtroom, according to Ford, allows the
defendant to remain anonymous; 3 9 publicizing the defendant's name and
photograph in the newspaper has the opposite effect. Defendants who
appear before Judge Ford will hear him justify the sentence by telling
them, "I believe that an open and public admission... make[s] it more
likely that the defendant will not commit further crimes." 4° One can
conclude that at least in the opinion of the sentencing judge, such a con-
dition of probation acts as a deterrent because it subjects the defendant to
punishment by public humiliation.
34. Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 842. One could envision other courts trying to tailor the
punishment to fit the crime. An interesting example of a unique condition fitting the crime would be
to require a convicted kleptomaniac to wear mittens while in public to make it more difficult to steal.
35. Id., 130 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43. One may argue that forcing the defendant to wear tap shoes
all the time potentially will subject the defendant to public ridicule or embarrassment because it is
not "normal" to wear tap shoes all the time in public. Such an argument fails to persuade, though, if
the defendant resides in a diverse and large city that may contain any number of individuals wearing
tap shoes in public. The argument may have more force, however, if the defendant resides in a small
town.
36. Id., 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
37. Id. at 813-14, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843. The court was concerned that interpreting the order
one way would preclude the appellant from engaging in any athletic activity. Conversely, interpret-
ing it to mean that the defendant just had to wear the shoes "as he leaves" home would render the
condition ineffective. Id.
38. Tybor, Unusually Creative Judges Now Believe Some Punishments Can Fit the Times, Chi-
cago Tribune, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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C. Drunk Driver Required to Put Bumper Sticker on Car.
In the 1986 Florida case of Goldschmitt v. Florida, the sentencing
court required a convicted drunk driver to place a bumper sticker on his
car that read: "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE. '41
In reviewing this probation condition, the appellate court found that the
trial court judge could impose any special condition whenever she
deemed it appropriate, provided that the condition bears some relation-
ship to the nature of the offense and the condition is otherwise lawful.42
The appellate court was quick to defer to judges who assert that the
bumper sticker "serves some useful purpose and that every first-time of-
fender should have one."43
In challenging the probation condition, defendant Goldschmitt
analogized the bumper sticker to the practice of the pillory during colo-
nial times. He also argued that the sticker violated the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The appellate
court rejected this argument, stating that "the differences between the
degrading physical rigors of the pillory and a small strip of colorful adhe-
sive far outweigh the similarities. The mere requirement that a defendant
display a 'scarlet letter' as part of his punishment is not necessarily offen-
sive to the Constitution."44
The Goldschmitt court appears to have concluded that creativity in
sentencing by judges, particularly in the probation context, should not be
suppressed unless clearly unconstitutional. In fact, the court notes that
submitting defendants to public disgrace often will heighten the deterrent
and rehabilitative impact of punishment. 45 The Goldschmitt court, and
other courts,4 6 consider such "behavioral sanctions" imposed as condi-
tions of probation to be appropriate, particularly for white-collar
criminals. 47 The court, however, did issue one caveat: "[S]uch innova-
tive dispositions can be carried to extremes which might offend constitu-
41. Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (court rejected a first
amendment challenge to such a condition). For a comprehensive analysis of the case, see Case
Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988).
42. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125 & n.3.
43. Id. at 125.
44. Id. (emphasis added); cf Case Comment, supra note 41, at 658 (concluding that the
bumper sticker violates the amendment by being constitutionally excessive in that it does not con-
tribute to the acceptable goals of punishment).
45. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125 (quoting United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d
911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982)).
46. See, eg., United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 1982) (court
upheld condition of probation imposed upon a corporate defendant requiring payment of fine to be
reduced dollar for dollar by the amount of contributions made to charitable organizations).
47. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 125.
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tional standards."' 48 Thus, whereas the court held that the bumper
sticker was not sufficiently humiliating to trigger constitutional objec-
tions,49 the Goldschmitt court clearly left open the possibility that a fu-
ture condition of probation could be sufficiently humiliating to warrant
striking it down as unconstitutional.
In reaching its conclusion, the court never clearly states that the
eighth amendment provides the basis for its analysis. However, its deter-
mination that the bumper sticker condition does not rise to a level of
constitutionally prohibited public humiliation stands in response to the
appellant challenging the condition as cruel and unusual. In addition,
although the Goldschmitt court does not explicitly consider whether such
conditions of probation constitute punishment, the court continually re-
fers to probation conditions, such as requiring a bumper sticker, as
"punishment." 50
Finally, the Goldschmitt court buttressed its holding, that the
bumper sticker condition does not violate constitutional limits, with its
appellate review policy. The court stated that it should not second-guess
a lower court's finding that a bumper sticker is "rehabilitative," unless it
finds the condition to be "utterly without foundation. '51
D. Child Molester Required to Post Warning Signs.
A final, most recent case, which may approach the level of constitu-
tional objection discussed in Goldschmitt, is the 1989 Oregon case of
State v. Bateman. 52 In Bateman, the court placed a convicted child mo-
lester on probation for five years subject to a condition, among others,
that he place a sign on both sides of his car and on the door of his resi-
dence stating in three-inch lettering: "DANGEROUS SEX OF-
FENDER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED. '5 3 Bateman had been
48. Id. at 126. An example of such an extreme condition is illustrated by Bienz v. State, 343
So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In that case, a probationer who was ordered into a halfway
house was additionally required to comply with all orders given by employees of the halfway house.
Id. at 914. One such order was that the probationer, who was accused of acting like a baby, was told
to wear diapers over his regular clothing. Although the case was resolved on other grounds, the
court took the opportunity to comment on the condition of wearing a diaper: "[S]uffice it to say that
a command ... that an adult male wear diapers in public would certainly be demeaning in the minds
of, so called, reasonable men.... [Not surprisingly, prior decisions involving such bizarre incidents
are sparse." Id. at 915.
49. Goldschmitt, 490 So. 2d at 126.
50. Id. at 125.
51. Id. at 126.
52. State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 464, 771 P.2d 314, 318 (1989) (held limited scope of
review on appeal does not allow court of appeals to determine if conditions of probation are validly
imposed).
53. Brief for Appellant at A-2, State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (1989) (Or.
App. No. A 44854) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
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convicted previously of sexually abusing a child.5 4 He had committed
acts of child molestation after offering unsuspecting children candy and
soda and luring them into his home. 55 Judge Dorothy Baker was con-
cerned that if she placed Bateman in prison, he would be released with-
out supervision.
In explaining why she imposed such a novel punishment, Judge
Baker expressed frustration and hostility towards child molesters: "One
time, I thought of dyeing all [child molesters] green and telling children
to stay away from green people."' 56 Judge Baker justified her require-
ment that the offender post signs as a response to the "lack of community
recognition of dangerous people."' 57 She hoped that even if the signs did
not actually deter individuals like Bateman, they at least would be a
warning to children whom he might otherwise lure into his trap.58
The defendant challenged the condition on a number of grounds in-
cluding the eighth amendment. He argued that the requirement of post-
ing such signs amounted to the court treating him as non-human.5 9 His
counsel argued that the
[d]efendant will be at best shunned from society and at worst subjected
to physical harassment and abuse. In placing him on probation, the
court is in effect telling him that he is capable of reforming his conduct
... while at the same time, in imposing these conditions, also inform-
ing him that he does not deserve to be treated as a human being.60
The defendant, in trying to distinguish the signs from the bumper
sticker upheld in Goldschmitt, argued that child molesters differ signifi-
cantly from drunk drivers. Since children hold a sacred place in society
due to their youthful innocence, offenses against them are condemned
more readily than other kinds of offenses.
In response to Bateman's eighth amendment challenge, the State ar-
gued that probation generally is not considered punishment and that pro-
bation has been viewed as an "act of grace" by which the defendant is
given the choice6t to avoid "punishment. ' 62 The State's response to the
54. Brief for Respondent at 4-7, State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (1989) (Or.
App. No. A 44854) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent).
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Silverman, A Modern-Day Scarlet Letter for a Sex Offender, 9 Nat'l L. J., Aug. 31, 1987, at
9, col. 1.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 22.
60. Id. at 23.
61. See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 188-91 (1967).
The author correctly argues that the "act of grace" theory suggests that constitutional limitations
upon conditions do not exist if the defendant is granted the privilege of probation. Id. at 190. How-
ever, the author argues that this act-of-grace theory has given way to the "unconstitutional condi-
tions" doctrine. Id. That is, "conditions imposed upon the granting of privileges and gratuities
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appellant's eighth amendment argument was that "the United States
Supreme Court has generally interpreted the clause as being 'specifically
concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal
institutions'. . . or as a last resort basis for reviewing whether an imposed
sentence of imprisonment is grossly disproportionate to the crime."
63
The thrust of the State's rejection of the eighth amendment argument-
aside from probation not being a form of punishment-was that warning
signs on the defendant's house and car do not rise to the level of extreme
punishment (such as death, unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or
unusually long incarceration) that has been the core of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence. 64
The State based its argument in Bateman on the flawed premise that
if imprisonment of ten years is constitutional, it follows a fortiori that
probation, which is less of an infringement, is also constitutional. 65 Such
an argument, taken to its logical conclusion, requires that any condition
imposed on a probationer must survive constitutional muster because
such a condition is a substantially less severe infringement on the defend-
ant's liberty66 than imprisonment or the death penalty. But this line of
reasoning ultimately fails because many criminal sanctions other than the
death penalty, including disproportionate imprisonment, have been
struck down as unconstitutional. Thus, it follows that certain conditions
of probation, even though they do not impose the ultimate sentence, may
be found unconstitutional.
The above illustrations of scarlet-letter conditions differ in their un-
usualness, severity, and degree of punishment by humiliation.67 These
conditions, though effective, are controversial because they fall on the
must be 'reasonable.'" Id at 191 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)). Such an
analysis would run parallel to a contract theory of probation. Note, supra, at 191. This theory
suggests that the probationer has entered into a contract with the judge to be on probation. Because
a person cannot consent, and have enforced, an illegal contract, this theory too should not restrict a
probationer's right to challenge conditions.
62. Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 24.
63. Id. at 32 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)) (citations omitted) (citing Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
64. Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 34.
65. Id. at 27.
66. This argument is rejected by many courts, which hold that a condition of probation must be
analyzed for what it is. These courts reason that a condition of probation must be analyzed against
what probation is meant to do. See, eg., Walker v. State, 461 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(invalidating, as not furthering probation's goal of rehabilitation, a condition that required the de-
fendant to purchase an amount of merchandise equivalent to the amount he had stolen and
returned).
67. At the less severe end of the spectrum is the requirement that the defendant wear tap shoes.
At the most severe end of the spectrum is the condition requiring that a drunk driver place an
apology and her picture in the newspaper or that a child molester be required to identify himself as
such.
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line between punishment and probation. These provocative innovations
call for a reexamination of the current limitations on the courts' power to
impose probation conditions-a reexamination that must be made in
light of probation's statutory goals.
IV. THE GOALS OF PROBATION
A. Rehabilitation-Probation's Primary Goal.
Probation represents a modem innovation in the history of criminal
sanctions, one that reflects the evolution of the humanitarian movement
in criminology.68 Probation has been defined as: "A sentence not involv-
ing confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in the
sentencing court to modify the conditions of sentence or to resentence
the offender if the offender violates the conditions. '69 Probation is
designed "to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender; to take advan-
tage of an opportunity for reformation which actual service of the sus-
pended sentence might make less probable. ' 70 Courts generally state
that the primary purpose of probation "is to rehabilitate the offender. ' 71
In addition, many state statutes explicitly provide that probation should
68. H. ALLEN, C. ESKRIDGE, E. LATESSA, & G. VITO, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN AMERICA
36 (1985) [hereinafter H. ALLEN].
69. Id. at 42. Other definitions include: "Probation is a disposition that allows the convicted
offender to remain free in the community while supervised by a person who attempts to help him
lead a law-abiding life." S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 205 (2d ed. 1973).
70. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
Section 1.2 of the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for Criminal Justice states
the reasons behind imposing probation instead of traditional sentences in appropriate cases:
Probation is a desirable disposition in appropriate cases because:
(i) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating the author-
ity of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing normal com-
munity contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement which often
severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the offender into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an effective correctional
system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon the innocent dependents of the offender.
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Probation, approved draft,
§ 1.2 (1970) [hereinafter ABA Project].
71. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980). A court should not try to
rehabilitate an individual at the expense of protecting the public. See also, People v. Keller, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 827, 840, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 192 (1978) (a requirement of waiver of fourth amendment
rights as a condition of parole for theft of a pen found not to be a reasonable means of achieving
rehabilitation); Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (because probation revocation proce-
dures must comport with due process, a proof of arrest in and of itself is not sufficient grounds for
permanent revocation of probation); State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112
(1977) (rule prohibiting defendant from purchasing an automobile held to be reasonably related to
his rehabilitation, but rule prohibiting operation of an automobile without permission was not rea-
sonably related to rehabilitation).
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be used to rehabilitate.72 Probation accomplishes rehabilitation by re-
turning the individual to the community and by assisting her in becom-
ing a law-abiding citizen. 73 Probation conditions that are designed to
help further rehabilitation include: reporting regularly to a probation of-
ficer; getting and keeping a job; attending school regularly; keeping rea-
sonable hours; avoiding indebtedness; abstaining from using illegal
substances; and avoiding disreputable places and associates.74 If no pro-
bation conditions are imposed, probation effectively equals release; on the
other hand, conditions that are too restrictive or cumbersome may defeat
probation's rehabilitative goal or unconstitutionally infringe on an indi-
vidual's liberties. For example, a condition of probation that amounts to
suppression of dn individual's freedom of expression would violate the
first amendment.75
In order to treat defendants similarly, a court generally considers
and applies a standard "laundry list" of conditions, 76 and after imposing
standard conditions, a judge will individualize the probation condi-
tions.77 When individualizing such conditions, however, courts have ig-
nored the rehabilitative goal of probation. In recent years, courts have
been especially active in tailoring punitive probation conditions as a re-
72. See eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 54-303(a) (1987 & Supp. 1989) ("assist the defendant in lead-
ing a law abiding life"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(9) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) (any
conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.7 (West 1987) ("The
purposes of probation are to provide the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defend-
ant .... "); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1204-2-m (1983) ("reasonably related to... rehabilita-
tion"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(F) (1989) ("reasonably related to ... rehabilitation"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(c) (Anderson 1987) (rehabilitate offender).
73. H. ALLEN, supra note 68, at 37 ("Probation is... tied to the correctional goals of rehabili-
tation and reintegration, providing the potential benefits to the offender as well as the community.").
74. See D. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 242-50.
75. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971).
76. See, eg., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1) (1988). The statute provides that a probationer will
be subject to the following conditions:
(a) Remain under the supervision and control of the probation department.
(b) Abide by the direction of the probation department and its representatives.
(c) Promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries of the probation officer relating
to probation performance.
(d) Truthfully report monthly at times and in a manner specified by the probation depart-
ment or its representative.
(e) Remain in the State of Oregon until written permission to leave is granted by the proba-
tion department or its representatives.
(f) Find and maintain gainful full-time employment, approved schooling, or a full-time
combination of both....
(j) Obey all laws, municipal, county, state and federal.
(k) Pay fines, costs including probation costs, attorney fees or restitution or any combina-
tion thereof ordered by the court on a schedule of payments determined by the court.
77. See G. KILLINGER, H. KERPER, & P. CROMWELL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 81 (1976) (citing National Advisory Commission's Correction Stan-
dards, § 5.4 Commentary 159-60 ("Conditions should be tailored to fit the needs of the offenders and
society .... ")).
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sponse to prison overcrowding, the cost of building new prisons, and
public disappointment with traditional punishments.78 Creative judges
have gone to new lengths to make the punishment fit the crime,79 some-
times imposing probation conditions that qualify more as punishment
than rehabilitation. Illustrative of such punitive conditions are the scar-
let-letter conditions previously discussed, since conditions of this sort re-
sult in the imposition of punishment by humiliation, while ostensibly
falling under the rubric of probation.
B. The Effect of Modern Probation Conditions Resembles the Effects
of Early Forms of Punishment.
The scarlet-letter probation conditions previously discussed 80 exist
on a continuum. At one end of the continuum are those conditions that
only superficially resemble historical precedents; arguably the one requir-
ing the defendant to wear tap shoes would fall at this end.81 Whereas
such a condition has punitive elements, they tend to be outweighed by
the close relationship of the condition imposed to the crime committed;
the condition directly thwarts a crucial element of the defendant's crimi-
nal conduct and is consistent with the goal of rehabilitation. 82
At the other end of the continuum are those conditions that in their
effect at least, closely resemble the stocks and pillories. At this end stand
those conditions, for example, that require the defendant to place a
bumper sticker on his car, his picture and an apology in the newspaper,
or a sign labeling him a convicted child molester on his residence and
car. 83 These conditions subject the defendants to public ridicule by label-
ing them as criminals. These conditions are distinct from that of merely
requiring the defendant to wear tap shoes because a bumper sticker or an
apology in the newspaper announces to the world the probationer's con-
78. See Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 NEW ENG. J. ON
PRISON LAW 367, 369-73 (1982).
79. Some of the more creative sentences include: a slumlord ordered to spend 30 days in one of
his rundown, rat-infested buildings; a woman convicted of pirating cable television service was told
not to watch cable TV shows for one year; a drug dealer who fathered three children outside of a
marriage was ordered to remain celibate for five years unless he got married. Tybor, supra note 38,
at 1, col. 3.
More recently, judges have required a convicted child molester to place an apologetic ad in his
hometown newspaper, and one judge in Florida required four men who allegedly stole crabs from a
trap to walk up and down a local bridge wearing placards stating that they were convicted of mo-
lesting crabs, which is a felony in Florida. M. Brarrigan & K. Blumenthal, Courts Using Humilia-
tion as Punishment, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1989, at B 11, col. 1.
80. See supra notes 30-67 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 35.
83. See supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text.
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viction. In contrast, wearing tap shoes in public, while possibly out of
the ordinary, does not tell the world anything about the individual's
criminality. As the appellant in State v. Bateman argued, "[The] De-
fendant will be at best shunned from society and at worst subjected to
physical harassment and abuse" 84; that is the price the defendant Bate-
man will have to pay for his "rehabilitative" probation.
The other defendants will have to pay a similar price, since each of
these conditions lead to legally imposed publicity. In contrast to the
public stigma these probationers will carry, an individual who is incar-
cerated is able to remain relatively anonymous since she does not walk
around "announcing" her conviction to society.85 Thus, such scarlet-
letter probation conditions impose punishment in the form of humilia-
tion, in much the same way as the historical sentences that punished by
humiliation.
C. The Tension Between Punitive and Rehabilitative Conditions.
As the preceding discussion suggests, modem scarlet-letter proba-
tion conditions create an obvious tension between probation's primary
goal of rehabilitation and the "judicially created" goal of punishment.
Thus, although statutes86 and judicial opinions87 recognize rehabilitation
as the primary goal of probation in practice, courts disagree about the
extent to which punishment is also a proper function of probation.88 The
resulting tension, and the lack of any creative flexibility within the statu-
tory framework, has provoked some courts to characterize obviously
punitive probation conditions as "rehabilitative. ' 89 Such a characteriza-
tion, however, could suggest erroneously that every condition of proba-
tion is rehabilitative.
The court's language in Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Com-
mission 90 illustrates the confusion (convenient or otherwise) that stems
84. Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at 23.
85. Such an argument is similar to the one that Judge Ford made in justifying the imposition of
a probation condition that required the defendant to apologize publicly in the newspaper. See supra
notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 72.
87. See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) ("primary purpose of
probation is to rehabilitate the offender"); People v. Keller, 76 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 143 Cal. Rptr.
184, 191 (1978); Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978); State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452,
454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977).
88. Compare Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945) (conditions of proba-
tion are not punitive in nature) with Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937)
(probation is a form of mild and ambulatory punishment) and Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F. Supp. 63,
66 (1970) (probation clearly contains punitive elements).
89. See, e.g., Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
90. 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
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from a blurring of the line between punitive and rehabilitative measures.
The Villery court first stated that imprisonment penalizes the defendant
by requiring him to repay his debt to society. Yet the same court also
asserted that imprisonment is a "rehabilitative device" when imposed as
a condition of probation.91 Such a characterization represents an awk-
ward attempt by the court to stay within the state's probation statute.
Courts have shown a disturbing tendency to define an obviously punitive
probation condition as "rehabilitative," simply because their state statute
allows them to impose rehabilitative conditions but does not allow them
to impose punitive conditions. 92
A second explanation, although no less critical of the linguistic
games courts are playing, is that these judges are engaging in judicial
legislation. Constrained by their state probation statutes, judges attempt
to rewrite their respective statutes to include punishment as a goal of
probation. In either case, courts such as the Villery court grant them-
selves power beyond that allowed by statute in imposing probation
conditions.
As several commentators have suggested, "[a] more realistic ap-
proach would be to recognize that punishment, like rehabilitation, can be
a valid rationale for imposing a probation ... term. The two are not
mutually exclusive."93 Indeed, probation conditions can have both puni-
tive and rehabilitative elements, as well as other characteristics. 94 Courts
need not characterize probation conditions as necessarily either punish-
ment or rehabilitation; rather courts should be candid and honest in la-
beling the conditions they impose on probationers. For example, a fine
imposed as a condition of probation should be labeled correctly as a pu-
nitive condition-as punishment-whenever it falls under the rubric of a
probation condition. Only when courts recognize that some probation
conditions also have punitive characteristics will the inadequacy of cur-
rent limitations on judicially imposed probation conditions become clear.
The inadequacy of limitations results when courts fail to strike down
conditions in cases in which the punitive characteristics outweigh reha-
bilitative concerns, and thereby fall outside statutory authority. In addi-
tion, if courts acknowledge that probation conditions are punitive in
nature, that will enable defendants to receive proper review of their pun-
ishment by challenging such conditions under the eighth amendment.
91. Id. at 1110.
92. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
93. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, § 5.01, at 185 (1983).
94. Probation also serves a deterrent function, and, in some instances, probation may constitute
restitution. See H. ALLEN, supra note 68, at 86.
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V. LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS
. OF PROBATION
Two broad categories of sources generally limit judicial discretion in
imposing probation conditions. The first centers on non-constitutional
limitations, and a number of cases defining the nature of these limita-
tions. The second involves constitutional95 limitations. 96
A. Non-Constitutional Limitations.
Non-constitutional 97 limitations confine judicial discretion in impos-
ing probation conditions by prohibiting conditions that cannot be utilized
generally as a penal sanction against any defendant. 98 In addition, non-
constitutional limitations require the court to consider the "reasonable-
ness" of the probation conditions imposed. As a part of the "reasonable-
ness" inquiry, courts review the condition to ensure that it furthers the
implicit or explicit statutory goals of probation. A number of recent
cases from federal and state courts help define these limitations and illus-
trate how they work (or fail to work) in practice.
As a general proposition, probation conditions that cannot be im-
posed as penal sanctions involve conditions that contravene public pol-
icy. For example, since a court cannot impose banishment as a penal
sanction, 99 such a condition is also invalid as a condition of probation.
In People v. Baum, 1o the sentencing court ordered the defendant to
"'leave the state of Michigan within 30 days and not return for [the]
period of probation,' which was fixed at five years." 101 The Michigan
Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, noted that although banish-
ment was permitted at common law, states should not engage in "dump-
ing" convicted criminals into other states. Such a policy, said the court,
would "disturb that fundamental equality of political rights among the
95. For purposes of this Note, references to the constitution mean the United States Constitu-
tion. When discussed within the context of a specific state, it will be assumed that the applicable
state constitution wording is the same unless otherwise noted.
96. This Note only explores an eighth amendment limitation. See infra notes 142-60. For a
more in-depth discussion of other constitutional challenges, such as the first, fourth, and fifth amend-
ments, see e.g., Weissman, supra note 78.
97. This category is used in a Note discussing in great detail all elements of judicial review. See
Note, supra note 61, at 181. Under a section entitled non-constitutional limitations, the author
discusses disfavored forms of punishment and fulfilling the purposes of probation. Id. at 197-201.
98. This argument was stated in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1975) ("[I]t is virtually certain that those restraints that have been held improper when placed
on prisoners... will also be unsuitable as probation conditions .... ").
99. See, e.g. Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (1962).
100. 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
101. Id. at 188, 231 N.W. at 96 (citing trial court's order).
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several states."102 The Michigan Supreme Court thus found that the
probation condition contravened public policy.103
Judicial discretion in imposing probation conditions also must be
confined within the goals of probation, and this requirement is enforced
in some state statutes that explicitly or implicitly impose a "reasonable-
ness" standard on probation conditions. 10 4 Several commentators have
suggested that this standard "has four interrelated dimensions, each at-
tempting to accommodate the conflicting interests of permitting proba-
tioners ...to be free from undue restraint while allowing necessary
restrictions on their behavior."10 5 They posit that a "reasonable" proba-
tion condition: (1) must satisfy one or more of the statute's rationales for
allowing probation; (2) must further the goals of probation; (3) must not
be impossible or extremely difficult to follow; and (4) must be appropri-
ate in light of the crime committed. 10 6
Similarly, in People v. Dominguez, 107 a California court elaborated a
three-part reasonableness test:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in
itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reason-
ably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ...
[goals] of probation and is invalid.108
In applying its own test, the Dominguez court concluded that requiring a
defendant convicted of robbery to abstain from future pregnancy was in-
valid. 10 9 The court reasoned that "[c]ontraceptive failure is not an indi-
cium of criminality."' 10
An interesting case in which a court held that the goals of probation
were not met by the probation conditions imposed is Higdon v. United
States. "I In this case, Higdon pleaded guilty to defrauding the govern-
102. Id.
103. Another court has termed such banishment as being either cruel and unusual or a violation
of due process. That court did not label which it was; rather, it stated flatly that the "condition is
unconstitutional." Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d at 76. On the other hand, conditions
of probation requiring the probationer to remain within a specified geographic region have become
standard. See, ag., OR. Rv. STAT. § 137.540(I)(e) (1988) (probationer must remain in the state of
Oregon until written permission to leave is granted).
104. See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text. For statutes expressly requiring that condi-
tions be reasonable, see supra note 72; MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
For cases reading this reasonableness standard into the state's statutes, see e.g., Watson v. State, 17
Md. App. 263, 301 A.2d 26 (1973); Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
105. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 93, § 5.09, at 209-10.
106. Id.
107. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
108. Id. at 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
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ment of several hundred thousand dollars. As a result, the sentencing
court ordered the defendant to forfeit his assets, including his home, to
the government and to work for a charity-full-time and without sal-
ary-for three years.1 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that these conditions taken together did not fulfill
the goal of probation1 13 because "[t]he primary purpose of probation is
... rehabilitat[ion]." 1 14 The court of appeals concluded that the cumula-
tive effect of the probation conditions was "not reasonably related to re-
habilitation of the offender." '1 15
Another case, Loving v. Commonwealth, 116 is an example of a case
in which the conditions imposed could have constituted either an im-
proper penal sanction or an unreasonable probation condition. The case
involved defendants who had violated Virginia's miscegenation law,1 17
and the trial judge suspended their sentence upon the condition that they
leave the state and not return together for twenty-five years. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, instead of analyzing and striking down the banish-
ment as against public policy, 118 applied a reasonableness standard,
which required that the conditions must be "reasonable, having due re-
gard to the nature of the offense, the background of the offender and the
surrounding circumstances."'1 19 In setting aside the trial judge's order,
the court focused on the reasonableness of the condition in relation to its
goal of preventing future violations. The court stated: "The condition
reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose was that the defendants not
again cohabit[ate] as man and wife in this state." 120 Therefore, the ban-
ishment condition was deemed invalid since no additional condition was
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the probation statute.
112. Id. at 896.
113. Id. at 899. The court did however indicate that if separated, any one of the conditions
could stand alone and be valid. Id. at 899-900. For other cases holding unique conditions of proba-
tion not serving the goals of probation, see, e.g., Walker v. State, 461 So, 2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (invalidating as non-rehabilitative a condition of probation that required defendant to
purchase an amount of merchandise equivalent to amount he had stolen despite fact that the mer-
chandise had been returned). For cases holding unique probation conditions do serve the goals of
probation, see, e.g., Mangiapane v. State, 178 Ga. App. 836, 344 S.E.2d 756 (1986) (condition that
convicted drunk driver complete written requirements of Boy Scout Merit Badge on subjects of
traffic safety and citizenship upheld as fostering goals of probation).
114. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897; see also supra note 72.
115. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898.
116. 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966), rev'd 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1960) (repealed by Acts of Assembly April 2, 1968).
118. The Supreme Court subsequently struck down the statute in Loving v. Commonwealth, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); see also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussion of case in which court
held banishment contravenes public policy).
119. Loving, 147 S.E.2d at 83.
120. Id.
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Whereas the non-constitutional limitations discussed above provide
a framework within which a sentencing judge can exercise discretion in
imposing probation conditions, these limitations fail to address the
proper mixture of punitive and rehabilitative conditions of probation.' 2'
In determining whether a condition is reasonable, the court focuses only
on whether that condition serves a proper goal of probation. If the con-
dition meets that test, the condition passes muster despite the presence of
punitive elements. Unfortunately, courts never take the next step to
weigh the elements against each other to determine if, overall, the puni-
tive elements of the probation conditions outweigh the rehabilitative
elements.
B. Constitutional Limitations.
The United States Constitution also limits the discretion of trial
court judges when they impose probation conditions. Traditionally, this
constitutional dimension to probation orders has been submerged under
the "act of grace" theory of probation, and, as a result, this theory has
severely curtailed constitutional challenges to probation conditions.' 22
The recent rejection of this theory, 123 however, has enabled probationers
to challenge probation conditions on both constitutional and non-consti-
tutional grounds.
A number of amendments in the Bill of Rights have provided the
basii for constitutional challenges to probation conditions. Use of the
first1 24 and fourth 25 amendments as vehicles for reviewing (and setting
aside) probation conditions has stirred controversy in both cases 126 and
121. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
122. There is no constitutional right to be rehabilitated, People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958), and thus a criminal has no right to be placed on probation. Rather,
whether probation is warranted is a discretionary decision once the judge deems the defendant an
appropriate candidate for probation. She then may place the defendant back into society under
conditions she deems to be appropriate.
123. See supra note 61.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... "
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
126. For first amendment challenges, see, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971)
(unconstitutional to prohibit an individual convicted of violating the tax laws from speaking out and
questioning their constitutionality as long as defendant does not encourage others to violate the law);
Morris v. State, 44 Ga. App. 765, 162 S.E. 879 (1932) (error in the imposition of a sentence, which
limited defendant's first amendment rights during probation, was not sufficient reason for setting
aside the verdict and trying the accused again for guilt or innocence); cf United States v. Workman,
585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (federal probation officers must obtain a search warrant in absence of
recognized exceptions to fourth amendment; evidence obtained through a warrantless search of pro-
bationer's home is inadmissible in a federal probation revocation hearing); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521
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commentaries. 127 In addition, courts occasionally have used the eighth
amendment to strike down a condition of probation. 118 Except for these
few instances, however, the eighth amendment issue has never been fully
addressed by either a court or commentator.1 29 The reason for the ab-
sence of a thorough eighth amendment analysis is unclear, but the Ninth
Circuit's 1945 decision in Springer v. United States 1 30 may partially ex-
plain the judicial hesitation to engage in an eighth amendment analysis.
In Springer, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion placing a World War II draft dodger on probation subject to a con-
dition, among others, that he donate a pint of his blood to the Red Cross
Blood Bank within thirty days.131 The court in Springer addressed in
dictum the issue whether the condition amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment: "The conditions of probation are not punitive in character
and the question of whether or not the terms are cruel and unusual and
thus violative of the Constitution of the United States does not arise for
the reason that the Constitution applies only to punishment." 132 The
recent trend towards punitive probation conditions suggests that
Springer's conclusory analysis is outdated. Modem analysis shows that
conditions of probation may constitute punishment. Scarlet letter condi-
F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (parole officer's warrantless search of parolee's home upon arrest was
reasonable; use of the evidence obtained during that search was not limited to parole revocation
proceedings), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
127. See, eg., Weissman, supra note 78, at 374-75; Note, supra note 61, at 204-05.
128. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
For a discussion of a case in which the Court has engaged in an eighth amendment analysis, see
infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. See also Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73,
76 (1962) (condition of probation amounting to banishment is either cruel and unusual punishment
or a denial of due process and thus unconstitutional).
129. The issue has been addressed summarily by a number of commentators. See, eg., Note,
supra note 61, at 205-06 (suggesting, in three paragraphs, that the eighth amendment applies to
probation conditions "[w]ithout attempting to delineate the substantive content of the eighth amend-
ment"); Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 GA. L.
REv. 466, 484-85 (1974) (summarily stating the court's conclusion that "probation is in no way a
form of punishment is erroneous").
130. 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).
131. Id. at 415.
132. Id. The court's holding with respect to the condition amounted to no holding at all. The
two concurring judges, whose votes made the decision unanimous, stated that because the question
was not properly before them, "we withhold any ruling." Id. The concurring judges in dictum
stated that as far as they were concerned the condition was void on its face as "invading the physical
person in an unwarranted manner." Id. at 416.
Amazingly, the decision has been interpreted in a variety of conflicting ways. See, eg., Fiore v.
United States, 696 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1982) (requirement of donating blood upheld); United
States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 679 & n.1 1 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. Consuelo-Gonza-
lez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975) ("this court summarily rejected the condition that the proba-
tioner donate a pint of blood"); Tamez v. Texas, 534 S.W.2d, 686, 691 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
(same).
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tions that humiliate by labeling "inflict suffering on the evildoer" and as
such constitute punishment, not rehabilitation. 133 It is time for courts to
set aside semantics and appropriately label probation conditions as hav-
ing punitive, rehabilitative, or other characteristics. Courts then can an-
alyze whether they have achieved the proper mixture of punitive and
rehabilitative conditions. Moreover, a court can independently analyze
those conditions found to be punitive under the eighth amendment. The
current system of limitations on judicial discretion obfuscates the puni-
tive aspect of probation and makes considered and independent analysis
impossible.
VI. PROBATION As PUNISHMENT: So WHAT?
Having concluded that certain probation conditions inflict punish-
ment, one may ask the question: "So what?" That is, does the conclu-
sion that probation conditions inflict punishment, in and of themselves,
beg the question whether these probation conditions exceed statutory au-
thority or constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Constitution?
A. The Non-Rehabilitative Goal of the Modern Mixture of Probation
Conditions.
The punitive aspects of some scarlet-letter probation conditions is
far removed from, and indeed almost antithetical to, the rehabilitative
goal of probation. As discussed above, probation "is in large part con-
cerned with avoiding future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live
productively in the community which he has offended against."' 134 Oner-
ous conditions that largely punish also severely hamper the rehabilitative
goal and may transform probation into punishment.
Reexamination of modem scarlet-letter conditions 35 in light of pro-
bation's rehabilitative function helps to distinguish those conditions that
are essentially punitive from those that are rehabilitative. Since society
has moved away from psychological punishments, the degree to which
scarlet-letter probation conditions humiliate the probationer provides an
important indicator in analyzing whether such conditions constitute pun-
ishment. Applying this analysis, one could argue, for example, that re-
quiring a probationer to wear tap shoes is a condition whose purpose
runs parallel to one of the aims of rehabilitation-specific deterrence. To
require such defendants to conform their conduct to the imposed condi-
133. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
134. ABA Project, supra note 70, Introduction, at 1.
135. See supra notes 30-67 and accompanying text.
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tions enables the court to encourage the individual to become a law-abid-
ing citizen; the probationer has a constant reminder that, by eliminating
the basic tool of the crime, 136 reduces the defendant's inclination to give
into his particular vice. In addition, the simple fact of wearing tap shoes
may not itself announce to the world a person's criminal conviction for
purse-snatching.13 7 Thus, although the probation condition may have
punitive elements-since wearing tap shoes inflicts a modicum of humili-
ation and suffering-a balancing of the elements tilts less towards puni-
tive than towards rehabilitative.
Analysis also shows that requiring a drunk driver to place a bumper
sticker on her car, identifying herself as a convicted drunk driver with a
restricted license, also serves the goal of rehabilitation. Every time the
driver gets into her car, the bumper sticker will remind her of the crimi-
nal conviction, and she will give notice to everyone who reads her
bumper of that conviction. In a sense, she is being legally required to
publicize her conviction, thereby subjecting her to public humiliation.
However, she may choose not to drive in order to avoid subjecting herself
to humiliation or embarrassment. This result would be ideally rehabilita-
tive since it completely deters the probationer from driving. Alterna-
tively, she may choose not to engage in the activity that resulted in
probation; if she chooses to drive, the bumper sticker may remind her
constantly of her offense,138 reinforce the gravity of her offense, and en-
courage her to refrain from drunk driving. Therefore, although the
bumper sticker potentially subjects the defendant to humiliation and em-
barrassment, the punitive aspect does not outweigh the strong rehabilita-
tive or deterrent effects of the condition.
On the other hand, careful review shows that requiring a drunk
driver to place his picture and an apology in the newspaper is more puni-
tive than the bumper sticker. The bumper sticker defendant can volunta-
rily avoid potential humiliation; the other defendant cannot voluntarily
avoid the apology in the newspaper. The defendant suffers humiliation-
a form of punishment-as a result of the legally imposed publicity, which
amounts to forcing the defendant to air his "dirty laundry" for the world
to see. However, while the picture and apology are more punitive than a
bumper sticker, they also have rehabilitative and deterrent effects. 139
136. The tap shoes prevented the purse snatcher from sneaking up on his victims.
137. See supra note 35.
138. It is possible to argue that a reminder on the dashboard would serve this same purpose
better than the bumper sticker. While arguably true, no court to date has tried such a requirement
probably because a sticker on the dashboard does not involve the imposition of humiliation.
139. The deterrence and rehabilitation functions are intertwined in the notion that the offender
will refrain from drunk driving to avoid the condition being imposed again.
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Nevertheless, in the "mix" of rehabilitation and punishment, the rehabil-
itative element does not outweigh the punitive aspect of humiliation.
A clearer case in which the punitive aspect looms large against the
rehabilitative element is the probation condition that requires a convicted
child molester to place signs on his residence and automobile. Analysis
shows that this condition steps over the line-it is more punitive than
rehabilitative. Certainly, one could argue that such a sign is necessary to
protect the public and to warn children of the danger this individual
presents.140 Whereas this argument may be valid, the punitive effects of
requiring the defendant to publicize his conviction in nearly every aspect
of his life clearly outweigh the rehabilitative effects. The signs will hu-
miliate the defendant and cause the general public to disassociate them-
selves from the defendant. Moreover, it will frustrate one of the primary
purposes of probation: to reintegrate the defendant into society. The
condition effectively places the defendant in a prison within society. As
the ABA has stated:
Other things being equal, the odds are that a given defendant will learn
how to live successfully in the general community if he is dealt with in
that community rather than shipped off to the artificial and atypical
environment of an institution of confinement. Banishment from soci-
ety, in a word, is not the way to integrate someone into society.141
Placing signs on the defendant that announce his conviction of child mo-
lestatfon wherever he goes creates an "artificial environment" in the
community into which the defendant may be reintegrated. Therefore, in
the "mix" of conditions, this legally imposed publicity constitutes more
punishment than rehabilitation.
Scarlet-letter probation conditions in any given case may constitute
punishment. Certain scarlet-letter conditions impose punishment by hu-
miliation and may hamper severely probation's statutorily mandated re-
habilitative purpose. For that reason, courts should be honest in their
approach and should accept that certain conditions of probation contain
punitive elements. Such an approach will enable them, consistent with
mandated statutory guidelines, to determine if the imposed probation
achieves the proper mixture of conditions. Independent of whether the
mixture of probation conditions fall within the statutory guidelines, puni-
tive probation conditions should be analyzed for conformity with the
eighth amendment.
140. In fact, such an argument was advanced by the State in this case. See Brief for Respondent,
supra note 54, at 49-50.
141. ABA Project, supra note 70, at 1.
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B. Modern Probation Conditions Should Be Subject to an Eighth
Amendment Analysis.
A brief review of the substantive content of the eighth amendment
and policy justifications for eighth amendment application indicates that,
independent of whether a court has achieved the proper mixture, proba-
tion conditions in appropriate cases can and should be struck down as
cruel and unusual punishment.
1. Substantive Content of the Eighth Amendment. One commen-
tator has described the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment 42 as "a flexible tool for protecting the values underlying
its language." 143 In Trop v. Dulles, 144 the Supreme Court developed this
interpretation, stating that the meaning of the eighth amendment must
be drawn from "the evolving standards of [human] decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." 145 Only Justice Black's concurring
opinion in McGautha v. California 146 has challenged this interpretation.
However, no other court has questioned Trop with any urgency. 147
Further exploration of the standard enunciated in Trop leads to the
conclusion that certain scarlet-letter probation conditions can be struck
down under such a standard. As Trop stated, "the basic concept under-
142. The Supreme Court has never drawn a distinction between the words "cruel" and "unu-
sual." The "cases [examining the distinction] indicate that the Court simply examines the particular
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to
any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual.'" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 n.32 (1957). If "unusual" is to be given a special meaning, then it should be an ordinary one.
Id. "Unusual" normally would mean something different than that which is ordinarily done. Id.
The Trop Court thus concluded that denationalization was of such anomalous quality that it would
meet the test of being unusual. Id.
143. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amend-
ment, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 838, 845 (1972). The author reaches this conclusion by proving the nega-
tive. That is, if it is a fixed standard, the question then becomes: "Which particular punishments did
the framers intend to proscribe, and is the challenged punishment among them?" Id. at 842-43.
Such logic would lead to the proscription of hanging, whipping, and cropping ears, as they were the
only ones mentioned during the debate over the eighth amendment. I ANNALS OF CONG. 754
(1789).
144. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
145. Id. at 101. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (eighth amendment should
be interpreted "in a flexible and dynamic manner").
146. 402 U.S. 183, 225-26, vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1971). Justice Black stated that a flexible
approach effectively would give judges legislative power. Id. However, the force of such concur-
rence is minimal considering that the case involved a constitutional due process challenge to unbri-
dled jury discretion in death penalty cases; therefore, the eighth amendment was not even at issue in
the case.
147. Eg., Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981) (cursorily
attacking district court's reliance on Trop's dignity of man standard), motion to vacate stay denied,
450 U.S. 975 (1981).
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lying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. "9 148
This standard embodies the ideal that society today is more civilized and,
as society has evolved, so too have its methods of punishment. Society
would not, for example, sanction a penalty of twelve years of hard labor
in chains for falsifying public records.149 Likewise, society should not
sanction a probation condition that effectively deprives a man of his dig-
nity by holding him out for public ridicule in every aspect of his life.150
Although Trop v. Dulles did not consider the punitive elements of
probation conditions in its eighth amendment analysis, the reasoning of
the court equally applies to probation conditions. If one accepts the pre-
viously stated conclusion that probation conditions are a form of punish-
ment, 151 no qualitative distinction bars an application of the eighth
amendment to punitive probation conditions with the same rigor as it is
applied to traditional punishments. Accordingly, the eighth amend-
ment's dignity of man standard should apply to probation conditions.
Under the "unusualness" standard of the eighth amendment, a con-
dition of probation requiring the convicted defendant to continue to label
himself a criminal would certainly be seen by today's standard as unu-
sual. Society has made a judgment to allow its imprisoned criminals to
rejoin society with relative anonymity after serving their sentences, and
has permitted probationers to remain relatively anonymous after their
return to society for rehabilitation. 152 Thus, modem society has rejected
completely methods of punishment like branding and the pillory, and the
humiliation associated with them. Any condition that requires a defend-
ant to label himself (e.g., the child molester with signs on his car and
home) or to be shunned by his fellow citizen violates Trop's concept of
the dignity of man.
A case that illustrates this possibility is Bateman. 153 Because Bate-
man cannot remain anonymous, the neighbors of this convicted child
molester will have the opportunity to inflict inhumane punishment on
148. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).
149. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
150. Such a case was illustrated earlier in State v. Bateman, supra notes 52-66 and accompany-
ing text, which required a convicted child molester to announce to the world his conviction by
placing signs on his car and home.
151. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
152. Total anonymity is nearly impossible in this day and age of mass media and live television
coverage of trials. Although accepting "societal" imposed publicity, legislatures have not yet em-
braced the notion of legally imposed publicity as punishment. To the contrary, it is common to find
in statutes an allowance for the expungement of records to totally avoid disclosure. Therefore, such
legally imposed publicity should not be sanctioned as a condition of probation until such time as the
legislatures deem it appropriate.
153. State v. Batemen, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (1984); see supra notes 52-66 and accom-
panying text.
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him. Therefore, a court should strike down, as cruel and unusual, a con-
dition such as this one that requires a child molester to place a sign on
his car and residence. 154
2. Policy Arguments Supporting Application of the Eighth Amend-
ment to Probation Conditions. Reinforcing the conclusion that "the
dignity of man" concept applies to probation conditions are policy argu-
ments supporting the application of the eighth amendment to probation
conditions.
First, a failure to apply the eighth amendment to probation condi-
tions permits judges to have unbridled discretion in imposing conditions
of probation. Since state statutes currently provide no limitation,1 55 al-
lowing judges to impose punitive conditions arbitrarily allows them to
erode the legislative goals of probation. The end result is that probation
becomes another form of punishment and not an alternative to
punishment.
The goal of modern probation statutes is rehabilitation, not punish-
ment.15 6 Until legislatures redefine this statutory purpose, judges should
respect probation's purpose by imposing only those conditions -that pri-
marily serve its rehabilitative goals. The eighth amendment supplies the
framework within which to maximize this result. Subjecting probation
conditions to an eighth amendment analysis forces judges to scrutinize
carefully those persons who are convicted and to utilize probation only
when it is appropriate. Therefore, an application of the eighth amend-
ment would conform probation conditions to the rehabilitative model
and would prevent judges from arbitrarily imposing probation as another
form of punishment.
Second, by failing to apply the eighth amendment to probation con-
ditions, courts afford probationers less constitutional protection than
prisoners. Prisoners have experienced widespread success in challenging
prison conditions under the eighth amendment.15 7 On the other hand,
courts continually have turned away probationers from the courthouse
without eighth amendment protection because they are not being "pun-
154. The result of striking down such a condition as cruel and unusual will not impact the
defendant's position as a probationer. Challenges to conditions of probation can involve upholding
some conditions while striking down others. Therefore, the probationer does not risk probation
being revoked by challenging the conditions imposed.
155. The statutes only require that the conditions be reasonable. See supra note 72.
156. Id.
157. See, eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) ("taken as a whole, conditions in the
isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment").
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ished."158 Because modem scarlet-letter probation conditions clearly
have punitive elements,1 59 the eighth amendment must apply in order to
preserve probationers' constitutionally protected rights.
3. Application of the Eighth Amendment to Modern Probation Con-
ditions. Reexamination of modem scarlet-letter probation conditions in
light of Trop's dignity of man standard could cause certain probation
conditions to be struck down. The analysis above shows that requiring
the purse snatcher to wear tap shoes would not violate Trop's standard
because, by wearing tap shoes, the defendant is not publicizing his con-
viction. Whereas the bumper sticker and the apology in the newspaper
each require a defendant to publicize her conviction, one could argue,
especially in the case of the bumper sticker, that the limited nature of the
publicity keeps the condition within the boundaries of Trop. The apol-
ogy in the newspaper is within Trop's boundaries because of the limited
duration of the exposure and the lack of a direct physical connection
between the defendant and the apology. On the other hand, the child
molester who is required to announce his conviction to the world in
nearly every aspect of his life, including the sanctity of his home, suffers
humiliation and punishment that transgresses the dignity of man stan-
dard. Described in Nathaniel Hawthorne's words, the child molester is
"tak[en] ... out of... ordinary relations with humanity, and enclos[ed]
... in a sphere by [him]self."1'
VII. CONCLUSION
Innovative judges should be commended for having the courage to
impose creative sentences. When their creativity strays too far, however,
appellate courts should reevaluate the trial court's exercise of discretion.
No coherent limitation is currently available to appellate judges who re-
view lower court's imposition of probation conditions. Courts should
put semantics aside and accept that probation conditions are a tool of
punishment, as well as rehabilitation. Until the legislature changes the
probation statute to include punishment as a proper goal of probation,
sentencing judges' discretion should be curbed so that they use probation
conditions in an appropriate manner. In the meantime, courts should
strike down probation conditions whose "mixture" contains more pun-
158. See, eg., Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945) (because the condi-
tions of probation are not punitive in character, eighth amendment questions do not apply to condi-
tions of probation that are intended to be an amelioration of the punishment prescribed by law).
159. See supra notes 30-67 and accompanying text.
160. N. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 51.
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ishment than rehabilitation as conditions that are outside statutory
authority.
In addition, because modem scarlet-letter probation conditions con-
stitute punishment in and of themselves, they should be subjected to the
eighth amendment's "dignity of man" standard. While not necessarily
striking down all such conditions, an eighth amendment review will fur-
ther curb judicial discretion until the legislature acts. Absent proper
statutory or constitutional review, judges often may thwart the goals of
probation statutes by imposing conditions that punish instead of rehabili-
tate. Until proper review begins, probationers will continue to enjoy less
protection than is rightfully available to them.
Jon A. Brilliant
